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TAMPERING WITH MARRIAGE
T HERE ought to be a law punishing, in the interest of the state,
those who tamper with marriage. Tamperers may be divided
arbitrarily into two obvious groups: those who, for their own pur-
poses, make use of the ceremony and comply with the legal formali-
ties, but who have little or no intentions of maintaining the orthodox
status; 2 those who deny that the state has an enforceable interest in
the family and insist that the process of establishing the relationship
is a matter of personal contract This second group, motivated by
a desire for social reform, is, perhaps, a desirable source of criticism
of the existing institution and should not come under the operation
of the law. The first group, however, is undesirable because it is
characterized neither by open and honest approval nor disapproval,
but, apparently conforming, serves insidiously to shake the solidarity
of the old-fashioned, stereotyped American family. The state has
already seen the need for statutory protection of certain aspects of
'At the present time the statutes relating to marriages may be classified under
the following heads: (a) statutes relating to the application for marriage (1 VrE-RNn,
AMERICAN FAMLY LAWS [19311 § 17); (b) statutes relating to the formalities of the
marriage ceremony (id. §§ 23-26; also [1931] 52 C. J. 1005) ; (c) statutes providing
which attempts to marry shall be valid (1 VERNIER, op. ci. supra, §§ 49, 50, 51, 53
and 57; [1925] 38 C. J. 1275 et seq.). At the present time there appear to be no
statutes which specifically make it a criminal offense to tamper with marriage.
- See infra notes 83-86.
3 There is a literature on this subject of which the following books are illustrative:
DELL, LovE IN THE MlAcHINE AGE (1930) ; ELLIS, L1TMLE EMSAYS OF LOVE AND VmTUE
(1930); LICHTENBERGER, DIvoRCE: A SOCuL INERPRETATION (1931); LINDSEY,
COMPANIONATE MARRIAGE (1931); POPENOE, MODERN IARRIAGE: A HANDBOOK
(1925); RUSSELL, M ARRIAGE AND MORALS (1929).
4 GOODSELL, A HISTORY OF THE FAMILY AS A SOCIAL AND EDUCATIONAL INSTITu-
TION (1930) 477 et seq.
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the institution. Statutes directed at control of sex irregularities' and
property aspects0 exist in abundance. But there is a blind spot as
to those persons who seek to profit by donning the traditional cloak
of marriage without intending to assume the obligations.
The Blind Spot
The interest of the state in encouraging conventional marriage
and in maintaining the orthodox status is evidenced by legislation'
and judicial opinion.8 By legislative and litigation processes the
rights of the individual members of the family have been clarified,
The nature and extent of the interest of the state in protecting the
marriage status are not completely defined." In considering a remedy,
one may choose either one of two extreme positions: abandon the
theory that the state has an interest and permit the principle of in-
dividual contract" to function, or clarify the interest and require
0 MILLER, CRiMINAL LAw (1934) § 96 (rape), § 142 (seduction).
o 3 VERNIER, op. cit. supra note 1, § 167 el seq.
The interest of the state is made apparent by many statutes prohibiting the marriage
of certain individuals. See for example, 1 VERNIER, op. cit. supra note 1, § 43.
'See Perry v. Perry, 199 Iowa 685, 202 N. W. 572, 574 (1925), in which the
court says: "Courts must recognize that society has an interest in the permanency and
stability of the marriage relation, and a severance of this relation must not be decreed
except for just cause * * *."
See also Spencer v. Spencer, 61 Fla. 777, 55 So. 71, 72 (1911), where the court
says: "The public is a silent party to all such suits, having an interest in their results,
inasmuch as they affect the status of children as well as public morals and decency."
And see generally SCHOUER, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, SEPARATION AND DOMESTIC RELA-
TIoNS (6th ed. 1921) §§ 1732, 1771 and 1922, and cases cited.
0) LICHTENBERGER, Op. cit. supra note 3, at 298 el seq.; MOWRER, DoAEsTIc DiscoRD
(1928) 25 et seq.
10 As long as the interest is evidenced only by general formulae in the body of
judicial opinions, it can hardly be said to be of much practical value. When, however,
the state enacts specific legislation to protect its interest, or when the court sets up
administrative agencies to assist it in the work, then one may say that the vagueness is
clarified. Agencies such as the King's Proctor in England (10 HALSBUIRY, Divotco,
LAws OF ENGLAND [2d ed. 19091 § 1212 et seq.), and the Friend of the Court in Detroit
(MICH. CoMP. LAws (1929) § 12783), indicate an awakening of responsibility beyond
the formal phase.
11This principle has been attempted on various occasions, but has broken down
after a period of time. Some form of marriage has finally made its appearance
in spite of lack of protection from the state. For example, the aftermath of the
breakdown of the Roman Empire found a type of Christian marriage developing. Again,
in the middle of the French Revolution there was a form of marriage. As a result of the
Russian Revolution, marriage restrictions were taken away entirely, but-public interest
has gradually forced more stable arrangements. CALVERTON, T14E BANKRUPTCy OF
MiARRIAGE (1928) 233 el seq.
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respect for it It is convenient to discuss the second alternative by
reviewing briefly the causes of the present inadequacy, to attempt
an analysis of the forgotten factor, and to predicate upon certain
assumptions and obstacles a proposal for a remedy.
Suggested Causes of the Present Inadequacy
Several causes may be advanced to account for the present lack
of certainty in the state's interest in protecting the marriage status.
The law has lagged behind the other social sciences in a study of
the human relations. The classical doctrine of the watertight com-
partrment theory of the social sciences' has tended to shut off the
law from normal interchange of ideas and discoveries in neighboring
fields. While the physician and the social worker," to say nothing
of the business man,15 have been learning to deal with human prob-
lems in the most realistic fashion, the lawyer functions in a system
which still clings to the elementary concept that the causes of marital
discord, as well as the symptoms, may be expressed in such simple
formulae6 as adultery, desertion and cruelty. There is all too little
interest in comparative law-that is in studying rules of law and
legal concepts in different jurisdictions and legal systems. There is
need for a comparative study of social and economic concepts, such as
marriage and the family, in each of the social sciences, including the
law. There should be some device for keeping each, if not abreast
of the others, at least in touch with what is going on. One may
question the practical efficacy of existing devices to this end 1
Again, the traditional processes of the law have been administered
in terms of litigation' Whatever may have been the value of this
1 POUND, PROC:EEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF SOCIAL WORK (1923)
152.
'8See MEDICAL CARE FOR THE AMERICAN PEOPLE (1932) 138 at seq.
L4 See generally the proceedings of the National Conference of Social Work.5 TAEusci, Standards of Business Conduct, PROFESSmioNAL Am BUSINESS ETHiCS
(1926) 242.
'16 See AO loc. cit. supra note 9; GROVEs, SKINNER AND SWENSON, THE
FAM.ILY AND rrs RELATiONsHIPS (1932) 152: "The legal ground for divorce is often
not the true cause."
17 For example, the functional approach of the law school has been the subject
of criticism. Brosman, Modern Legal Education and the Local Law School (1935)
9 TuLANE L. REv. 517-543; see infra note 72.
18Iegal scholars have long insisted upon the symbolic character of our litigation
processes, the trial representing a quarrel concerning the thing in litigation, 'with the
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device in a ruder age,"0 or even today, in the settlement of disputes
over property,"0 there are modern problems of human relationship
which do not respond21 to proposals for solution based upon a modi-
fied battle. The interest of the state in marriage has usually come
before the courts incidentally in the course of a conflict between
two antagonistic individuals, each seeking personal remedies, redress
or protection against the other.2 Thus the logical train of judicial
thought, which begins with the generalization that the state is in-
terested in marriage and the family, is set in the frame of a process
resulting in an advantage primarily to a litigant.
The law traditionally offers the public a litigation process which
ends with a court order as final as the surgeon's knife. It has been
slow to provide something comparable to "treatment" by a phy.
sician. Only recently has the marriage license clerk been invested
with the responsibility and discretion of refusing licenses for phy-
sical and mental defects or other causes.2 Only recently has there
judge as an umpire between the contestants. In this picture the attorney is seen as
analogous to the champion in the earlier trial by battle. See MAINE, EARLY HISTORY Ot
INsTrrUTIONS (1875) c. 23. These processes have been variously criticized by Sunder-
land: "To sue is to fight and fights make endless feuds. Parties hesitate to resort to
the courts because they shrink from a state of war with their neighbors or business
associates." Sunderland, A Modern Evolution in Remedial Rights,-- The Declaratory
Judgment (1917) 16 MICH. L. REV. 69, 76. "Doubtless, the early conception of the
jury as a formal substitute for the old methods of proof-battle, compurgation, and
ordeal-accounts for the absence from the record of all matters affecting the means
by which the jury arrived at the verdict." Sunderland, The Problem of Appellate Re.
view (1926) 5 TEx. L. REv. 126, 142.
1" Originally, trial by battle was confined to the nobility; it was considered an ad.
vance over a system of private vengeance. McKEcHNIE, MAGNA CARTA (1914) 360
et seq.
20 MARSHALL AND MAY, THE DIVORCE COURT, OHio (1933) 11.
21 See Elson, Divorce-A Study in Cooperation between Family Welfare Agen.
des and Legal Aid Bureaus, a paper delivered at a meeting of the National Conference
of Social Work in Kansas City (1934), and published in Bulletin No. 35 of the
National Association of Legal Aid Organizations.
See also Lenroot, The Child, the Family and the Court (U. S. Dept. of Labor,
Pub. 193, 1929) 21.22 The following cases illustrate the fact that the remedy provided by divorce and
annulment procedures is available only for the party who emerges triumphant from the
ordeal: Weiss v. Weiss, 174 Mich. 431,437, 140 N. W. 587, 589 (1913), where the court
says: "That rule (recrimination), as applied to divorce, means that it is a remedy pro-
vided only for the innocent and injured party, and if the evidence discloses that both
have shown irounds for divorce neither is entitled to it." Also see Rolfsen v. Rolfsen,
115 S. W. 213 (Ky. 1909); Staples v. Staples, 136 S. W. 120 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911).
23.AY, MARRIAGE LAWS AND DECISIONS (1929) 15 et seq.; 1 VERNIER, Op, cit.
supra note 1, § 17.
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been a movement to create specialized domestic relations courts.2'
Even today divorce jurisdiction is generally withheld from such
courts, seriously limiting their usefulness."5 The judges, who hear
divorce cases, are not always free to view the subject of family
dissolution or rehabilitation in the scientific light of individualized
treatment." A perennial revision of the substantive and procedural
law relating to the family under the auspices of a continuing com-
mission of experts in each jurisdiction would be of value.
The Mental Element in Marriage
Improvements in the process of handling domestic problems have
come about, in large measure, because courts and legislatures are in-
creasingly concerned over the presence in marriage problems of a
third element in addition to sex and property." Sex regulation has
been a matter largely for the criminal law." Property interests may
be disposed of civilly in actions between the parties. -  But the mental
element in marriage is of concern to the state as well as to the
parties.
In an earlier day in the system of ecclesiastical law the mental
element in marriage was included in the broader term-"the spiritual
element.""0 Historically, the English ecclesiastical courts formulated
24 See Lenroot, supra note 21, at 45.
25 (1931) 5 ENCYC. Soc. SCIENCES 197.
2 ..* * In a system so highly developed as our own, precedents have so covered
the ground that they fix the point of departure from which the labor of the judge begins.
Almost invariably, his first step is to examine and compare them. * * * Stare decisis
is at least the everyday working rule of our law. * - * the work of deciding cases in
accordance with precedents that plainly fit them is a process similar in its nature to
that of deciding cases in accordance with a statute. * 0 * Some judges seldom get
beyond that process in any case." CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL Pnocss
(1928) 19-20.
2 For example, in the case of Gowin v. Gowin, 264 S. W. 529, 535 (Tex. Civ. App.
1924), it is said: "The marriage contract is one of a peculiar character, and subject to
peculiar principles."
In addition, see CALVERTON, op. cit. supra note 11, cc. X1 and XVI; HALIX,
WoMAN IN SovIEr RUSSIA (1934); AUSHELES, BROK, RAGOOD, MmRAGE, FAMLY
AND DIvoRcE (Moscow, State Pub. Assoc. 1925); Kopelianskaia, Marriage in the
U.S.S.R. (1935) 349 I.rVING AGE 160; Strong, We Soviet Wires (1934) 32 AMERICAN
MERCURY 415.
2 GRoVs, MALRIAGE (1933) 5 et seq.
293 VERNIER, op. cit. supra note 1, § 180; Daggett, The Wife's Action for a
Separation of Property (1931) 5 TuLANE L. REV. 55.
3 0 SIR JAMES DALRYmPLE OF STAIR, INSTITUTIONS OF THE LAvW OF ScoTLAND
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a dignified concept to support it.' Marriage had sex and property
aspects, but it was, as well, a sacrament. When jurisdiction over
marriage became a matter for the civil courts, the machinery for
enforcing the sanction changed from church to state. At first mar-
riage was regarded as an ordinary commercial contract,"2 perhaps
because the English common law courts took over only the commer-
cial aspects of marriage, leaving the rest to the ecclesiastical juris-
diction." With two court systems functioning side by side, the
spiritual element was not likely to be forgotten. In this country, from
colonial days, there was only one system of courts." In 1857 the
English ecclesiastical control came to an end." With only civil
machinery to administer it, something was lost from the spiritual
overtones. The broader concept is gradually emerging in the present
legal system. It has still to reach the earlier level.
The civil ideal may be expressed as a "marriage of true minds."
This has a significance broader than is implied in the doctrine "con-
sensus non concubitus facit matrimonium."'  It is one of those
(1681) Pt. 1, fit. iv. See also GOODSELL, PROBLEMS OF THE FAMILY (1928) 3-101;
Ecclesiasticism and the Law (1908) 16 AMER. LAWY. 275. "The marriage cere.
mony may be regarded either as a civil ceremony or as a religious sacrament o ,
KAN. REV. STAT. ANN. (1923) § 101.
3' 1 COLQUHOUN, A SUMmARY OF THi ROMAN CIVIL LAW (1860) §§ 546, 568.
32See 1 BL. COMM. *433.
33For example, see Baker v. Smith, Sty. 295 (K. B. 1651) ; Holcroft v. Didenson,
Carter 233 (Com. P1. 1672).
- Our courts, in colonial days, had difficulty in determining the nature and extent
of their jurisdiction to deal with family problems, but finally came to the conclusion
that the jurisdiction was equitable and not ecclesiastical. "The jurisdiction of this court
is that of the English chancery, with the various additions which have been made to it by
our own laws. This court has jurisdiction in cases of fraud, and especially in all cases
of contracts procured by fraud. * * *
"Viewing this contract as one obtained by fraud, and upon this ground alone, I am
of the opinion, that this court has cognizance of the case, and may annul this mar,
riage." Ferlot v. Gojon, 1 Hopk. Ch. 478, 494 (N. Y. 1825). See also Denison v.
Denison, 35 Md. 361 (1872).
In Short v. Stotts, 58 Ind. 29 (1877), the court said: "The doubt which seems to
have arisen in the early cases was not whether, on the principles of the common law,
the action would lie, but whether, as the ecclesiastical courts had conusance of matri.
monial matters, such action could be maintained in a common law court * * * but the
establishment of separate ecclesiastical courts in England was not part of the common
law * * * the whole system of English ecclesiastical courts as separate from the civil,
is foreign to our institutions, and has no place in our jurisprudence. There is here,
therefore, no conflict of jurisdiction between cdurts of one class and the other."
•
35 Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857, 20 and 21 "Vicr. c. 85.
36Dalrymple v. Dalrymple, 2 Hagg. Cons. 54 (1811).
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concepts which could be better understood if studied comparatively
and simultaneously in all the social sciences. The comparative
ineffectiveness of the law in dealing with the mental element is
indicated by its unwillingness to attempt to do anything toward the
solution of certain legally marginal domestic problems which recur
with some frequency r One wonders what physicians, psychiatrists,
social workers and representatives of other sister professions would
have done with these cases if interprofessional cooperation were
easy.
Before progress in the name of reform can be made, an adequate
formula should be stated. Judicial opinions distinguish marriage
from the ordinary contract by stating that it is "something more," a
"status."3s But it is not dear how much more or what are the ele-
ments of the status. One may ignore the "blind spot" and leave the
subject to be treated as an individual contract. But if one chooses
to argue that it is for the public welfare, and therefore justifiable,
to develop the interest of the state in the subject and to stabilize,
regiment and dignify domestic relations, an occasion is offered for
an exercise of the police power s Before taking action, however,
it is well to establish a foundation of certain assumptions and to
consider certain obstacles.
3rRyle v. Waechter, 202 Iowa 695, 210 N. W. 926, 49 A. L R. 557 (1926);
Somberg v. Somberg, 263 N. Y. 1, 188 N. E. 137 (1933); Morrow v. Yannantuono,
152 Misc. 134, 273 N. Y. Supp. 912 (1934) ; Snedaker v. King, ill Ohio St. 225, 145
N. E. 15 (1924).
8 "It is also to be observed that, whilst marriage is often termed by text writers
and in decisions of courts a civil contract-generally to indicate that it must be founded
upon the agreement of the parties, and does not require any religious ceremony for
its solemnization-it is something more than a mere contract. * * * It is an institution,
in the maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply interested, for it is the
foundation of the family and of society, without which there would be neither
civilization nor progress." Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190, 210 (1888).
In Gowin v. Gowin, 292 S. W. 211, 213 (Tex. Comm. App. 1927), it is said:
* * Marriage, because it is a status and so far as anything here present is con-
cerned is governable by state law."
See also Gaovas AND OGBURN, A&MIECAN MAMAUGE AND FAM.Y RELAIONSHIPS
(1928) 3-4; Gaovrs, Companionship in .Marriage, op. cit. supra note 28.
a, The police power has already been extended in other analogous situations as far
as it would be necessary here. Cf. for example, the Federal Espionage Act (Act of
Congress of June 15, 1917, 40 STAT. 219 [1917], 50 U. S. C. § 33 [1934], as
amended May 16, 1918, 40 STAT. 553); Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616
(1909).
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Assumptions
The first assumption is that under modern conditions, the family,
as a piece of social, economic and legal machinery, is valuable to
the state.4" It provides (1) a place for rearing children, (2) a de-
vice for holding private property, (3) a means for regimenting the
mutual interests of the sexes.41 It is a different sort of agency from
the primitive,42 the Roman4" and the medieval" prototypes. It is
shorn of much of its solidarity and authority." It is attacked as an
obstruction to socialization of property, sex freedom, individualism. "
Yet, it is regarded as a fundamental human need. Insofar as it is
useful to the state, public interest may attach to it and protect it.
The second assumption is that since the family is admittedly
subject to modification by social and economic pressure, it may also
be affected adversely or beneficially by statute and court decision.
In the past these efforts have been directed largely in three direc-
tions-segregation of married people into a special class, improving
the condition of members of the class, and controlling the process
by which the relationship may be dissolved. The state, by legal
process, has sought progressively to draw a line between those who
are married and those who are not, by such devices as registration"
40 GROVES, op. cit. supra note 28, at 38 et seq.
41 JACOBS AND ANGELL, A RESEARCH IN FAMILY LAW (1930) 37, 38.
42 For a discussion of the purposes of the primitive family, see (1931) 6 IINCYC.
Soc. SCIENCES 65; GOODSELL, op. cit. supra note 4, at 31 el seq.; GROVES, SOCIAL
PROBLEMS OF THE FAMALY (1927) C. 2.
432 WESTERMARCK, THE HISTORY OF HUMAN MARRIAGE (1925) 332 ci scq,;
GOODSELL, op. cit. supra note 4, at 112 ei seq.
44 "Quite as truly as in primitive Palestine, Greece and Rome, the home of the
early middle ages was the heart of the industrial life of the community." GOODSELL,
op. cit. supra note 4, at 277.
45 GROVES, op. cit. supra note 28, at 215.
46 CALVERTON, The Decay of Modern Marriage, op. cii. supra note 11, especially
at 70 et seq.
47 The church had very definitely in mind the establishment of a strong family.
Similarly, modern legislatures by their action of legislation indicate a belief in the use-
fulness of the laws which they pass.
See Seagle, Family Law (1931) 6 ENcYc. Soc. SCIENCES 81; GOODSELL, op. Cit.
supra note 4, at 537 et seq.
48 The following statutes show the historical progress of registration of marriages
in England over a period of sixty-two years: Marriage Act, 1836, 6 and 7 Wbf. IV, c. 85,
§ 30; Marriage and Registration Act, 1856, 19 and 20 VIcT. C. 119, § 12; Extra-
parochial Places Act, 1857, 20 VIcr. c. 19, § 10; Marriage (Society of Friends) Act,
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and license,"9 inspection for physical defects,' a ceremony' and the
like. Rewards and special privileges may be given to make the status
sociologically and economically,"2 as well as romantically, attractive.
1860, 23 and 24 Vicr. c. 18, § 2; Regulation of Births, Deaths and Marriages (Army)
Act, 1879, 42 and 43 Vicr. c. 8, § 2; Foreign Marriage Act, 1892, 55 and 56 VICr.
c. 23, § 20; Marriage Act, 1898, 61 and 62 Vlcr. c. 58, § 1 (3). For registration of
marriages in the United States, see 1 VERNiER, op. cit. supra note 1, § 34.
9 The English statutes requiring issuance of license before performance of the
marriage ceremony have an ancient lineage extending over a four hundred year period.
25 HEN. VIII, c. 21, §§ 2-12 (1533-4); Canones Ecdesiastid, 1603, 101, 104; Mar-
riage Act, 1823, 4 GEo. IV, c. 76, § 20; Marriage Act, 1824, 5 GEo. IV, c. 32, § 2;
Marriage Act, 1836, 6 and 7 WM. IV, c. 85, § 1; Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Act, 1847,
10 and 11 Vicr. c. 98, § 5; Canones Ecdesiastid, 1882, 2; Marriage Act, 1886, 49 and
50 Vicr. c. 14, § 1; Marriage Measure, 1930, 20 GEo. V, no. 3, § 3.
For a compilation of the American statutes governing marriage licenses, see 1
VERN., op. cit. supra note 1, at 59.
1o The most modem development in the field of prohibited marriage began at the
turn of the century. This is the prohibition of marriages on account of disease. Only
half of the American jurisdictions have, as yet, adopted such legislation. Eight states
(Alabama, Louisiana, Maine, North Dakota, Oregon, Texas, Wisconsin and Wyoming)
provide that the parties must present to the license issuer a medical certificate to the
effect that they are free of the prohibited disease. Louisiana and Wisconsin provide for
detailed physical examination. 1 VENrER, op. cil. supra note 1, at 200. A leading
case on the subject is Peterson v. Widule, 157 Wis. 641, 147 N. W. 966 (1914), up-
holding the constitutionality of the Wisconsin statute requiring a medical examination
and certificate.
," In England the ceremony has held and holds deep religious significance, and,
consequently, has become an important part of the marriage act. In the United States,
however, statutes upon the form of marriage do not attempt to impose detailed rules.
Over half of the jurisdictions have not legislated upon the general subject at all, and
in the twenty-three that have, not one requires any particular form of marriage ceremony.
1 VERNiER, op. cit. supra note 1, at 92. Common law marriages require detailed cere-
mony. HowARD, A HISToRY oF MATRiONIAL INSTITUTIONS (1904); 1 VErNmIr,
op. cit. supra note 1, at 102; Hall, Common Law Marriage in New York State (1930)
30 COL. L REV. 1.
r 2The field of taxation offers a notable example of such privilege. In England
a married man secures an exemption of £150, a single man is allowed £100. For
the first child, the parent is allowed an exemption of £50 and £40 for each subse-
quent child. Finance Act, 1920, 10 and 11 GEO. V, C. 18. The United States
federal income tax law allows a married person living with his spouse $2500 as a
personal exemption, while his single neighbor is allowed only $1000. In addition the
married man is allowed $400 for each child. 48 STAT. 692 (1934), 26 U. S. C.
§ 25(b) (1935). In Germany a tax is levied on all bachelors. Taving German Bachc-
lors, LrrERARY DIGEST (July 19, 1930) 14.
Headlines in our daily newspapers depict the economic favoritism shown European
married couples. 4412 Wed to Obtain Award Offered by Fascist Party, N. Y. Times,
Apr. 23, 1935, p. 5, col. 4; German Unemployment Relief Plan Includes Dowries for
200,000 Brides, N. Y. Times, far. 23, 1934, p. 22, col. 4; Mussolini Offers Award
to Army, Navy, and Air Force Officers in Birth Rate Drive, N. Y. Times, May 16, 1935,
p. 25, col. 3.
Another field is that of homesteads and exemptions in the United States. "The con-
servation of family homes is the purpose of homestead legislation. The policy of the
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The state in this country for the last century has also been more and
more interested in facilitating dissolution of the marriage tie for
• cause." The consent divorce," just around the corner for the in-
dividualist, may be a logical next step. Such a relaxation of his-
torical legal obstacles to family dissolution has a part in modifying
the formal marriage relation." The creation by law of a special
class with rewards and benefits to its members cannot but affect
the attitude of the public toward membership in the class. The
state has exercised its police power in the past to keep out of that
class certain persons who, because of age, physical and mental con-
dition, and other reasons, are not regarded as suitable members.
To include in the list of undesirables those who intend to tamper
with the institution for their own purposes is merely to enlarge the
protection of the state to cover mental, as well as physical and prop-
erty, menaces.
The third assumption is that the state is interested in fostering,
not marriage at any cost, but a family stable enough to perform
certain, definite, social and economic functions." To this end some
preliminary selection of personnel is inevitable. If one conceives of
such a family as analogous to a professional group charged with
certain functions in the public service, it is possible to argue for the
erection and maintenance of useful admission requirements. Under
such a system adherence to a standard of conduct and a code of
ethics could be enforced by a process of discipline more like dis-
barment"1 than divorce.
state is to foster families as the factors of society, and thus promote the general wel.
fare * * * the state is concerned in the conjugal and parental relations; in the promotion
of marriages and the rearing of children." WAPLES, HOMESTEADS AND EXEMPTIONS
(1893) § 2. "The protection of the family from dependence and want is the ex-
pressed object of nearly all the homestead and exemption laws." THOMPSON1 HOME-
STEADS AND EXEMPTIONS (1878) § 40.
Even in time of war the family is shown partiality. Our 1917 Draft Act provided
that the President should have the power to exclude "those in a status with respect
to persons dependent upon them for support which renders their exclusion or discharge
advisable." 40 STAT. 79 (1917), 50 U. S. C. § 165 (1934).
53 NEv. COMP. LAws (1929) § 9460.
" Note, Collusive and Consensual Divorce and the New York Anomaly (1936) 36
COL. L. REv. 1121.
5 See reflections of this attitude in current literature collected and quoted in CALVER-
TON, op. cit. supra note 11, at 70 et seq.
"6 Brinkmann, Social Aspects of the Family (1931) 6 ENCYC. Soc. SCIENCES 67.
m7In re Peck, 88 Conn. 447, 91 At. 274 (1914); Wernimont v. State ox eel,
Little Rock Bar Association, 101 Ark. 210, 142 S. W. 194 (1911).
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A fourth assumption is that the public will accept reasonable
regimentation in regard to marriage r In the past this has been
true. At present there are differences of opinion on the subject."
The nature of that regimentation will determine its acceptability.
The success already achieved by the better domestic relations courts
and social agencies suggests the trend of such future control. Action
by the state assumes the inability of the family to solve its own prob-
lems. It is a matter of public education to persuade the unspe-
cialized public to substitute for the simpler traditional legal remedies
and patent medicines the specialized services of professional workers
competent to provide individualized treatment for families which are
not functioning properly. Interprofessional cooperation should be a
fundamental part of the process. The family as distinguished from
its members should receive more consideration. If the proposals
for regimentation are made with discretion, their reasonableness
should carry them through the initial period of misunderstanding.
The individualist will probably not be convinced.
It is not enough to consider a group of assumptions. Certain
long standing concepts are obstacles to an advance. It is important
to consider them.
Obstacles
The first obstacle is the idea that marriage is a cure-allU ' If a
person has been guilty of pre-marital irregularities, the ceremony,
58 See Adey, King Edward's Abdication, 1 EvzNws (Jan. 1937) 65.
59 See IJCHTENBERGER, op. cit. supra note 3, at 98: "With the passing of the b-lief
in the sacramental nature of marriage in all Protestant countries, and the general estab-
lishment of civil-contract marriage throughout modem civilization, the doctrine of the
indissolubility of marriage was destined to decline, together with the era of ecdesiastical
domination."
See also RUSSELL, The Family and the State, op. cit. supra note 3; DELL, op. cit.
supra note 3; CALVzaTON, op. cit. supra note 11.
60 Official sanction of this attitude has been given by the various state statutes pro-
viding for the legitimation of children born out of wedlock, by the subsequent marriage
of their parents. 4 VERNIER, op. cit. supra note 1, § 156 et seq.
Undoubtedly, the most fertile sources of this idea can be traced to the characteristic
formulae expounded by (1) moving pictures: Eastman, What Can We Do About the
Movies? (1931) 6 PARENrS MAGAZINE 19; Fumas, foral War in Hollywood (1935)
143 FORTNIGHTLY 73; Dane, What is Love? Is it What We See in the Afories? (1935)
94 FORUM 335; (2) books, magazines and newspaper artides: What Women like to
Read in Newspapers, LITERARY DIGEST (May 12, 1934) 9; Keyes, Happily Ever After
(1929) 88 GOOD HOUSEKEEPING 38; Durant, Modern Marriage (1930) 18 MENTOR 7
Sugrue, I Sent a Letter to fy Love (1937) 123 AMERICAN M4AGAZINE 40; and (3) tab-
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like some magical formula, too often, is supposed to make him re-
spectable, restore his social standing, set the record straight, legiti-
mate his children, protect him from criticism.
From the standpoint of the state this is a matter of fact to be
determined in each case, not an assumption. The number of un-
satisfactory marriages proves this.6 Among the applicants to marry,
there are eligibles and ineligibles. The problem is to determine, as
soon as possible, in which class a particular person belongs."2
Administrative machinery is necessary to make such determina-
tion. 3 If this machinery has interprofessional contacts its decisions
will be based upon a broader and profounder set of facts. Stand-
ards are necessary. If they are drafted along interprofessional
lines they will fit the situation more accurately.
If the standards and administrative machinery are well estab-
lished some applicants will fail of admission. Among them will be
some who are unable to make the grade, and others who do not
choose to conform.
The position of those outside the pale today is less harsh than
in colonial times.6' Pre-marital irregularities are being recognized
more and more as symptoms of human need. They call forth
a spirit of scientific inquiry with a view to a remedy rather than
a somewhat self-righteous ostracism. The term "bastard" has given
loid newspapers: Our Lying Press (1932) 135 NATION 547; Spivak, Rho and Fall ol a
Tabloid (1934) 32 AMEICAN MERCURY 306.
"1 LICHTENBERGER, Comparative Statistics, op. cit. supra note 3, at 41.
62 Pre-marital advice clinics are being established in a number of cities. For a
discussion of them and their related problems, see: POPENOE AND JOHNSON, APPLInED
EUGENICS (1933); Popenoe, Marriage Clinic (1932) 7 'ARENrs MAGAZINE 15;
Crozier, Why Marriages Go Wrong (1933) 115 AMERICAN M61RnCURY 60; Popenoc,
Cooperation in Family Relations (1934) 26 J. oF HOME ECON. 483; Popenoe, Is
there a Scarcity of Good Husbands (1936) 28 READERS DIGEST 21.
63 In the legal profession such administrative machinery is set forth in detail
by the various state statutes. See Rules for Admission to the Bar (23d ed. West
Pub. Co. 1936). Similarly, the medical profession has its statutory administrative
set-up. Laws and Board Rulings Regulating the Practice of Medicine in the United
States and Abroad (45th ed. American Medical Assoc. 1936).
64See 3 CALHOUN, SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN FAMILY (1932) 266: "A
man that formally broke up his family or a woman that formally deserted her hus.
band had to take into account the antagonism of the neighborhood and the bitterness
of its frown. City life is a great solvent of custom; neighbors do not know each
other, or if they do, they are tolerant, or the problem may be solved by moving,
Hence one is free to follow fancy in matters of divorce."
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place to the gender phrase "illegitimate child." And this in turn
has been modified to "illegitimate parent," which places the blame
where it belongs. The child of the non-conformist may become
legitimate.' The public, through certain news agencies, is inured
to unpleasant facts.' Whether it reacts morbidly or intelligently
to such a stimulus depends in large measure upon the balanced
leadership afforded by the state. An opportunity is presented here,
not to assume placidly the universal operation of a simple formula,
but scientifically to gather facts and patiently to set about solving
one of the most complicated problems which man is called upon to
face.
The second obstacle is the idea that the litigation process will,
in general, accomplish socially desirable results when applied to
the solution of domestic problems. The domestic problem is seldom
a purely legal one. It has ramifications of social and economic
character. To solve the legal aspect of the case without regard to
the others is as bad as treating the disease rather than the patient'a
The litigation process is perhaps adequate for the determination of
individual private rights. It does not serve so well to enforce the
interests of the state in the family because it can be set in motion
by one member of a family for blackmaill vengeance,"° acquisition
4 VERNiER, op. cit. supra note 1, §§ 242, 245.
1 See supra note 60.
67The records of domestic relations courts, when contrasted with the records of
the orthodox courts in handling domestic cases, indicate the far greater variety of prob-
lems which the new method of approach reveals.
as It is sometimes said that "the operation was a success though the patient died."
w Many suits for breach of promise of marriage are under suspicion as having been
brought for blackmail. See Brown, Breach of Promise Suits (1929) 77 U. OF PA. L.
REv. 474; White, Breach of Promise of Marriage (1894) 10 L. Q. REv. 135; Wright,
The Action for Breach of the Marriage Promise (1924) 10 VA. L REv. 361.
Whatever the motives for bringing such suits may be, it is interesting to compare
some newspaper headlines in New York State before and after the statute prohibiting
such actions. Before its passage such headlines as: Mirs. G. T. Orr sues E. B. Ort and
Mrs. D. Clark for Alienation of Husband's Affections, N. Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1935, p. 5,
col. 7; Mrs. H. Bedford-Jones Awarded $100,000 in Suit Against Former Husband's
Wife, N. Y. Times, Apr. 5, 1935, p. 19, col. 5; Mrs. L T. WFells, First Wife of G. C.
Wells, Sues Z. R Wells, Second Wife, N. Y. Times, Apr. 19, 1935, p. 19, col. 4,
appeared with frequency.
In 1935 New York State abolished its so-called "heart.balm" causes of action.
N. Y. Laws 1935, c. 263. Shortly thereafter the following headline appeared in the
New York Times: Supreme Court Dismisses $100,000 Suit Brought by irs. C. F.
Vanderbilt Against Mrs. L. V. Hegeman as Banned by 1933 N. Y. State Law, N. Y.
Times, Dec. 30, 1935, p. 2, col. 3.
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of property,' as well as a determination of the rights of the par-
ties. The grinding of a divorce mill 2 is too speedy to give much at-
tention to the individual case. An inquisitorial process 3 promises
more. Perhaps a combination of the two would work well.
A third obstacle is the undue emphasis placed by emotional
literature, music and the motion picture upon happiness rather than
duty as the object of marriage.7' A combination of the two will do
for the individual. The state is interested primarily in seeing that
the responsibilities are cared for. One wonders whether there may
not be a value in the devices leading to marriage in other countries,
as family agreements " and professional intermediaries."0 In marriages
contracted under such devices the business obligations are, at least,
brought to the attention of the parties and the ultimate decision
involves several non-emotional factors. It might be well for the
state to emphasize the value of self-discipline as a benefit to be
derived from marriage.
70 Typical of this attitude is the famed "shot-gun wedding" and similar methods
of coercion. See Lee v. Lee, 176 Ark. 636, 3 S. W. (2d) 672 (1928); Short v.
Short, 265 Ill. App. 133 (1932); State v. Edgins, 171' S. C. 81, 171 S. E. 444 (1933),
(1934) 43 YALE L. J. 1193.
71 Galusha v. Galusha, 116 N. Y. 635, 22 N. E. 1114 (1889); State ex rel, Hagert
v. Templeton, 18 N. D. 525, 123 N. W. 283, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 234 (1909).
See Munson, Some Aspects of the Nature of Permanent Alimony (1916) 16 COL.
L. REv. 217.
The alimony racket has been the subject of much investigation in recent years,
In New York City there is an organization entitled Alimony Reform League of New
York City. In 1935 it ublished the results of a three year survey. See Report on
Three Year Survey Among Divorced Couples, N. Y. Times, July 1, 1935, p. 17,
col. 5. Further efforts are indicated by a headline, Creation of Marital Court Urged
for Morals Hearings before Temporary Alimony and Counsel Fecs are Awarded, N, Y.
Times, Dec. 16, 1934, § 2, p. 5, col. 3.
72 It has been stated that divorce cases are handled so rapidly that the court does
not have time to consider available evidence of the physician, social worker, or
psychiatrist as to the family situation. MARSHALL AND MAY, THE DivoRcE COURT-
MARYLAND (1932) 41, 67.
7SMonachesi, Italian Surveillance Judge (1936) 26 J. Cwts. L. 811; Dak and
Rheinstein, Machinery of Law Administration in France and Germany (1936) 84
U. or PA. L. Rnv. 846; Tyndale, Organization and Administration of Justice in France,
with an Outline of French Procedure with Respect to the Production of Evidenca
(1935)13 CAN. B. REV. 567.'
74 See Introduction to MowaaR, FAMILY DissOLunON (1927).
75 For an excellent discussion of this subject, see 2 WESTERMARCIC, Consent as a
Condition of Marriage, op. cit. supra note 43, at 278-353.
78Ibid.; DEPoMERAx, MARRIAGE (1930) 157,
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A fourth obstacle is the idea that marriage is a natural right7
and that it should be jealously guarded against encroachments by
the state. Statutes have hedged it about with restrictions."h These
statutes have been held constitutional. Every effort that is made
to draw more dearly the line between the rights of the state and
those of the individual, forces public attention and aids the in-
dividual to decide where he stands in the present general uncertainty
surrounding marriage. If the attitude of the state were dearer, it is
likely that more would rally in support.
Misunderstanding is occasioned by the fear that barriers to mar-
riage will create more illicit relationships! ' Such relationships exist
under the present system. Perhaps a lowering of the existing stand-
ards would include more people bearing the magical tag. It does
not follow that the resulting condition of marriage and the family
would be more stable. Psychologically, it may serve to arouse respect
for the institution to make it difficult of access!' Keeping up
with the Joneses is a recognized American characteristic. Again the
leadership of the state will determine, in large measure, the progress
of the idea.
We have now viewed with alarm, and theoretically, a certain
activity described as tampering with marriage, and have enumerated
7 rIn the now famous case of Peterson v. Widule, 157 Wis. 641, 147 N. W. 966,
974 (1914), involving the constitutionality of the Wisconsin law requiring medical
examination before marriage, Justice Marshall, in dissenting from the decision of the
majority, said: "I cannot agree to the decision of this case because: (1) To marry is a
natural right. It is thus guaranteed by the purpose and spirit of the constitution."
The majority held, however, that supervision and control of marriage fell within the
police powers of the state and that marriage was not an unlimited natural right.
781 VaamarE, op. cit. supra note 1, §§ 37-47.
" Buck v. Bell, 143 Va. 310, 130 S. E. 516, 51 A. L R. 855 (1925), aft'd, 274
U. S. 200 (1927).801f married people are regarded as a professional group, then all the concepts,
administrative machinery and motives regarding the raising of professional standards are
in point. There seem to be certain stock objections to raising standards in any
professional field. In the law see: Proceedings and Reports of the Section of Legal
Education and Admission to the Bar of the American Bar Association for any year,
set forth in the Annual Reports of the American Bar Association, and in the Amed-
can Law School Review. See also Porterie, The Two Sides of the Question of
Raising Academic Requirement for Admission to the Bar from a High School Educa.
tion to a Two-Year College Course (1935) 1 LA. S. B. 17.
In the field of medicine, see: Bierring, The Standards of AMedical Education and
Qualification for Licensure (1934) 3 BAR EOXA INER 275.
6 "Thwarting is the natural stimulus to fighting." MORGAN, CratZ PSYcHOLOG-'
(1932) 174.
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certain assumptions and obstacles on the road to a solution. The
next step is to secure a clearer picture of the objectionable conduct
and the device for controlling it.
The Practical Problem
The proposal which is the subject of this article, is a law punish-
ing those who tamper with marriage. The word "tampering" re-
quires definition. The elements of the proposed offense should
be (a) the act of marrying or procuring or encouraging someone
else to go through the marriage ceremony, (b) with the major intent
of accomplishing some personal benefit rather than accepting the
obligations incident to the orthodox marriage. The act of marrying
is already defined in the laws of the respective states;" the act of
procuring or encouraging is a matter for the jury; the nature of the
intent is also a matter for the jury. Whether the question should
or should not go to the jury should depend upon an interprofessional
investigation by competent experts into the legal, social and eco-
nomic implications of the case, rather than upon some exclusive
legal formula. There are four situations known to the law where
the parties may evidence an unorthodox intent: marriages involving
fraud,83 marriages involving duress,"4 marriages in jest,"3 and mar-
riages where the parties endeavor to modify the orthodox terms of
82 1 VERNIER, op. cit. supra note 1, § 14.
8 Brown, Duress and Fraud as Grounds for the Annulment o1 marriage (1935)
10 IND. L. J. 473; Crouch, Annulment of Marriage for Fraud in New York (1921)
6 CoRN. L. Q. 401; Ernmerglick, Nullity of Marriage for Fraud (1931) 19 KV. L. J,
295; Vanneman, The Annulment of Marriage for Fraud (1925) 9 MNN. L. REV. 497;
Note (1874) 1 CENT. L. J. 235; Note (1922) 22 CoL. L. REV. 662; Note (1925)
73 U. OF PA. L. REv. 195; Note (1919) 28 YALE L. J. 272; Note (1924) 34 YALE
L. J. 207; (1925) 5 B. U. L. REV. 138; (1918) 6 CALIF. L. REV. 224; (1920) 20
COL. L. REV. 708; (1925) 25 COL. L. REV. 233; (1932) 18 CORN. L. Q. 97; (1920)
34 HARv. L. REV. 218; (1925) 10 VA. L. REV. 765; (1920) 30 YALE L. J. 88, See
also Reynolds v. Reynolds, 3 Allen 605 (Mass. 1862); Moss v. Moss, [1897] P. 263.
84Bassett v. Bassett, 72 Ky. 696 (1873); Brown, supra note 83; Note (1907) 7
COL. L. REv. 128; Note (1930) 30 COL. L. REV. 714; (1934) 14 B. U. L. REV. 837;
(1917) 3 CoaN. L. Q. 51; (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 1191; Notes (1899) 43 L. R. A.
814, and (1919) 4 A. L. R. 870; Note (1934) 91 A. L. R. 414.
s5 (1931) 11 B. U. L. REv. 296; (1921) 21 COL. L. REv. 194; (1931) 19 GEo.
L. J. 239; (1930) 9 N. C. L. REV. 96; (1931) 4 So. CALIF. L. REV. 160; (1930)
64 U. S. L. REV. 617; (1922) 29 W. VA. L. Q. 60; (1930) 6 Wis. L. REV. 42;
Note (1921) 11 A. L. R. 215. See Reszel v. Reszel, 7 Mich. 33, 40 N. W. 858
(1883); McClurg v. Terry, 21 N. J. Eq. 225 (1870); Crouch v. Wartenberg 86
W. Va. 664, 104 S. E. 117 (1920).
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the status by mutual agreements or mental reservations.' Each of
these situations has a legal and an interprofessional or public aspect.
Marriage Involving Fraud
From the legal viewpoint the pivotal question is the presence
of fraud. There are three generally accepted rules as to what con-
stitutes fraud in consummated marriages. The English rule, more
rigid than the others, is limited to situations where there is a mis-
take as to the identity of the person.' The majority rule in the
United States recognizes situations where there has been misrepre-
sentation or concealment of some fact essential to the marriage
contract or the marriage relation."' Ante-nuptial pregnancy of the
wife, if unknown to the husband, is ordinarily such an essential.p
Ante-nuptial lack of chastity,0 bad character,' insignificant fortune,'
poor health," difference in religion,' and uncertain temper ' are not
S16Jackson v. Jackson, 93 N. J. Eq. 216, 113 Ad. 495 (1921); Note (1929) 27
MCH. L. REv. 934; (1918) 6 CALIF. L. REv. 224; (1931) 25 ILL L RMv. 556;
(1914) 63 U. oF PA. L. REv. 695; (1926) 12 VA. L REV. 239; (1921) 30 YALu
L. J. 756; Note (1916) L. R. A. 1916E 1274.
M1,foss v. Moss, [18971 P. 263; Alexander v. Alexander, (1920] S. C. 327; EvEns-
LEY, Domssnc RELATIONS (4th ed. 1926) 26-30.
88The general rule has been succinctly stated by Crouch as follows: "In the case
of a consummated marriage, a misrepresentation (or concealment probably) of a ma-
terial fact, going to the essence of the marriage contract or of the marriage relation,
made with intent to induce another to marry and without which he would not have
done so, justifies the court in annulling the marriage; but upon grounds of public
policy the misrepresentation of any other fact probably does not." Crouch, .upra
note 83.
89A pre-nuptial pregnancy: Gould v. Gould, 78 Conn. 242, 61 AUt. 604 (1905);
Wallace v. Wallace, 137 Iowa 37, 114 N. W. 527 (1908); Smith v. Smith, 171
Mass. 404, 50 N. E. 933 (1898).
90 Generally, pre-nuptial unchastity: Bryant v. Bryant, 171 N. C. 746, 88 S. E.
147 (1916); Varney v. Varney, 52 Wis. 120, 8 N. W. 739 (1881).
9
'
1Misrepresentation as to honesty and industry: Corder v. Corder, 141 Md. 114,
117 Ad. 119 (1922) ; Dooley v. Dooley, 93 N. J. Eq. 22, 115 Ad. 263 (1921) ; Ke*s
v. Keys, 6 fisc. 355, 26 N. Y. Supp. 910 (1893); Sheridan v. Sheridan, 186 N. Y.
Supp. 470 (1921).
92Misrepresentation as to wealth or social status: Wier v. Still, 31 Iowa 107
(1870) ; Browning v. Browning, 89 Kan. 98, 130 Pac. 852 (1913) ; Oswald v. Oswald,
146 Ld. 313, 126 AU. 81 (1924); Chipman v. Johnston, 237 Mass. 502, 130 N. B. 65
(1921); cf. Brown v. Scott, 140 114d. 266, 117 Ad. 114 (1922).
93 Misrepresentation as to health: Lyon v. Lyon, 230 Ill. 366, 82 N. E. 850 (1907);
Cummington v. Belchertown, 149 Mass. 223 (1889).
6 'Misrepresentation as to religion: Beckley v. Bedley, 115 Ill. App. 27 (1904).
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essentials.
The more liberal and the minority American rule began in this
fashion,' but with the advent of a series of recent cases in New
York, seems to have become very much the same as in ordinary
contracts T*
The rule as to non-consummated marriage has approximated that
of ordinary contracts. 8 The legal process, through litigation, leads
to the granting or refusal of an annulment, a remedy or reward to
one party against the other. The interest of the state is confined
to generalized formulae.
From the interprofessional and public viewpoint the question is
whether a family thus brought into being, can survive the handi-
cap and perform, in reasonable fashion, the functions required of
it by the state. If it shows promise, it should receive all possible
encouragement and assistance from every professional group which
is in a position to make a contribution. If not, it should be dis-
solved not because of the fraud, but because it is useless to perform a
public service. The functioning portion of society should not be
burdened with it.
Such action would clarify the interest of the state in the family.
It might deal with the rights of the individual members of the fam-
ily in other proceedings. If the defrauded spouse can show damages,
he or she should receive a judgment of complete reimbursement.
But the fact that one or both of the parties (and perhaps their
accomplices) has promoted a marriage with the intent to defraud
as a major portion of his mental attitude, should justify criminal
action by the outraged state. The public institution of marriage has
been treated with contempt and the offender should be punished.
Marriage Involving Duress
From the legal viewpoint marriage is regarded as a civil con-
tract, valid only when made with the consent of both parties. Con-
95AMisrepresentation of mildness of temper and amiability of disposition: William.
son v. Williamson, 34 App. D. C. 536 (1910).
9 See supra note 88.
"Shonfeld v. Shonfeld, 260 N. Y. 477, 184 N. E. 60 (1933), and cases cited
therein.
98 1 BisHoP, MARRIAGE, DivoRcE AND SEPARATION (1891) § 763.
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sequently, if one of the parties is forced into the situation under
duress, there is no legally valid meeting of the minds. The prob-
lem then is to determine what acts constitute duress23
In laying down the rule as to cases where the man is the one
who claims he was forced into the marriage, there are two factors.
If he does only what the court feels he ought to do, it is not duress.P
If there is a total absence of any direct threats of bodily harm pre-
vious to or at the time of the marriage, there is no duress.0'
Where the woman is the claimant, the rule is usually a subjective
one-was this woman coerced?' Physical force or threats are not
always necessary provided her will is subject to another's. If duress
is found, the result of the proceeding is an annulment. This is
a proceeding between the parties. The interest of the state is
limited to statements of policy, such as that the man did no more
than he ought to do. In a particular case, it may very well be a
question whether he ought to marry at all rather than an assump-
tion that marriage is the proper step to take in the interest of the
parties.
From an interprofessional or public viewpoint the question is
whether a family thus brought into being can survive the handicap
and perform in reasonable fashion the functions required of it by
the state. If it shows promise it should receive all possible encour-
agement and assistance from every professional group which is in
a position to make a contribution. If not, it should be dissolved,
not because of the presence of duress, but because it is useless to
perform a public service. The functioning portion of society should
not be burdened with it.
The interest of the state in the individuals may be expressed
9sa See 3 WoRDs AND PHRA ES (Ist Series, 1904) 2270: "At common law "dures
meant only duress of the person, and nothing short of such duress amounting to a
reasonable apprehension of imminent danger to life, limb, or liberty, 'was sufficient to
avoid a contract * * *."
I State v. Edgins, 171 S. C. 81, 171 S. E. 444 (1933).
119 Rogers v. Rogers, 151 Miss. 644, 118 So. 619 (1928).
101 Doscher v. Schroder, 105 N. J. Eq. 315, 147 Atl. 781 (1929); see 1 Bouvmn,
LAW DIcIONARY (Rawle's 3d rev. (8th ed.] 1914) 960: "There is no legal standard
of resistance which a person acted upon must come up to at his peril of being remediless.
The question in each case is: Was the person'so acted upon by threats of the person
daiming the benefit of the contract, for the purposes of obtaining it, as to be bereft
of the quality of mind essential to the making of a contract, and was the contract
thereby obtained."
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by awarding damages to the injured party and punishing criminally
those who thought so lightly of marriage as to coerce someone into
it-not for the good of the public, but for personal ends.
Marriage in lest
From a legal standpoint reality of consent is essential to the
validity of a contract. If marriage is merely a contract, those who
say the words without intending the consequences, should, logically,
be regarded as having created no binding legal agreement. Some
courts have taken this view, saying:
Mere words without any intention corresponding to them, will not make a
marriage or any other civil contract. But the words are the evidence of such
intention, and if once exchanged, it must be dearly shown that both parties
intended and understood that they were not to have effect. In this case the
evidence is clear that no marriage was intended by either party; that it was a
mere jest got up in the exuberance of spirits to amuse the company and them-
selves. If this is so, there was no marriage.102
Other courts, perhaps because the facts varied somewhat, have
laid down a different and sterner ruling:
These facts show that both parties had arrived at the age at which, under the
law, they were authorized to contract marriage. A proper construction of the
pleadings shows that, although the marriage was agreed upon and took place
in a spirit of levity and joke, nevertheless there was no fraud on the part
of either party as against the other. The pleaded facts of the case, therefore,
fail to disclose any informality or other cause for setting aside the marriage. 103
The result of the legal process in such cases is to grant or refuse
an annulment it the request of one of the parties. The interest
of the state is indicated in the foregoing quotations. But it is
submitted that in the litigation process the interest of the state is
directed toward a point which is not essential. The question is
not-did the parties intend to go through the marriage. In a
particular case the policy of the law in refusing an annulment may be
as harmful as if it were granted. The example which the facts
furnish the community may have far-reaching repercussions.
From an interprofessional or public viewpoint the question is
12 McClurg v. Terry, 21 N. J. Eq. 225 (1870).
13 Hand v. Berry, 170 Ga. 743, 154 S. E. 239, 240 (1930).
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whether a family thus brought into being can survive the handicap
and perform in reasonable fashion the functions required of it by
the state. If it shows promise it should receive all possible en-
couragement and assistance from every professional group which is
in a position to make a contribution. If not, it should be dissolved,
not because of jest, but because it is useless to perform a public
service. The functioning portion of society shuld not be burdened
with it.
The interest of the state in the individuals may be expressed
by awarding damages to the injured party and punishing criminally
those who treated marriage as a matter of jest.
Marriage under Special Agreement
From the legal viewpoint occidental marriage has certain fairly
well-recognized fundamentals. Where an individual, by mental
reservation,'0 or both parties, by some express or implied agree-
ment,"°' seek to create an individualistic marital status, the law
frowns. Here again the legal solution is the refusal or the granting
of an annulment. The courts speak in the following terms:
Marital intercourse, so that children may be born, is an obligation of the
marriage contract and "is the foundation upon which must rest the perpetua-
tion of society and civilization." The obligation may not be modified by
private agreement between the parties.
The evidence in this case convinces me that the defendant entered into the
marriage with the intention of not submitting to marital intercourse and of
not having children; that the plaintiff believed the defendant would submit
to marital intercourse and entered into the marriage with that belief. Under
such circumstances the marriage will be annulled.105
The interest of the state in the present litigation process is
limited to the expression of policy toward marriage. It does not go
so far as to endeavor to determine the reasons for the unusual situa-
tion or to invite interprofessional aid in its solution.
From an interprofessional or public viewpoint the question is
whether a family thus brought into being can survive the handicap
°M ,iilar v. Millar, 175 Cal. 797, 167 Pac. 394, Ann. Cas. 1918E 184 (1917);
(1918) 6 CAIF. L. REv. 224. See also supra note 86.
10 McClurg v. Terry, 21 N. J. Eq. 225 (1870) ; Barker v. Barker, 151 N. Y. Supp.
811 (1914), (1915) 63 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 690.
0 6 Miller v. Miller, 132 Misc. 121, 122, 228 N. Y. Supp. 657, 658 (1928).
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and perform in reasonable fashion the functions required of it. This
is to be determined by expert testimony, not by an assumption.
The interest of the state in the individuals may be expressed
by awarding damages to the injured party and punishing criminally
those who endeavor to graft upon the recognized fundamentals, con-
ditions of their own.
Here are a set of examples. As to each there is a legal and in-
terprofessional or public approach. The machinery for the legal
approach adjusts the difficulties between the parties, but does not
clarify the interest of the state. At present the most popular tool
available is the process of annulment.
Annulment as a Remedy
Annulment is a concept which has appeared in various legal sys-
tems: Greek,"'7 Roman,03 and early Germanic.1 9 The medieval ec-
clesiastical law used it liberally in dissolving marriages where divorce
was prohibited."' Surrounding it were the procedures of penance..
and excommunication.' The decrees of the court rested upon the
conscience, as well as upon the person and property, of the litigant." '
After the case was at an end he did not pass out of the super-
vision of the court, but remained in a species of lifelong probation.
The English ecclesiastical courts employed the process with
little, if any, change. The transition to the present civil court was
made with a minimum of disturbance.
In America, except for control of the state by the New England
1073 WESTEJmARCK, op. cit. supra note 43, at 318; GOODSELL, op, i, supra note
4, at 96; DE PoMERAX, op. cit. supra note 76, at 162 et seq.
108 COLQUHOUN, op. cii. supra note 31, § 1108; WESTERMARcK, op. ci. SUpra
note 43, at 319; GOODSELL, op. cit. supra note 4, at 139; Dii PomERAI, op. cii, stra
note 76, at 162 et seq.
1o9 WESTERMARC c, op. cit. supra note 43, at 325; GOODSELL, op. i. supra note
4, at 202; DE POMERAI, op. cit. supra note 76, at 162 et seq.
110 GOODSELL, op. cit. supra note 4, at 203-206.
"'THwiNG, THE FAMIy (1913); GOODSELL, op. c. sipra note 4, at 206;
SHELFORD, MIARRmw AND DIVORCE (1841) 177.
112 GOODSELL, op. cit. supra note 4, at 203.
1" DE PoMERAI, op. cit. supra note 76, at 175 el seq.
114 COLQUHOUN, op. cit. su/pra note 31, § 644; CARTER, A HISTORY OF Tl ENG.
LISH COURTS (1927) 145.
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church," annulment was a civil and not an ecclesiastical process.
While its name remained the same, its significance was modified.
Penance and excommunication were abandoned, and with them that
wide command of the facts of the situation which helps to insure
against litigation error. The conscience of the litigant became his
own. The sanctions of the state might affect his person and property,
but were much less awful than their predecessors. Most serious, the
probation period disappeared.
Thus reduced, annulment still serves to dispose of certain invalid
marriages. Under the older statutes"' the discretion of the court
was limited. Under some, of the more recent statutes" this discre-
tion is plenary; this is more like the ecclesiastical process. The lim-
itations upon it are: its employment as a means of punishing a guilty
spouse,"9 a task properly for the criminal law; its employment as
an instrument to decide guilt or damage between parties,' a task
properly for the civil law; its employment as a litigation process, a
task unsuited to the development of the interest of the state in the
family. It should be aided to regain a position analogous to that
which it held in ecclesiastical law and should be considered as one of
several judicial tools.
The Proposed Remedy
Bringing together the various threads, it appears that to develop
the interest of the state in marriage and the family certain specific
remedies are desirable:
1. A careful segregation of objectives and legal processes so
that the individual rights of the members of ailing families may be
disposed of individually without obscuring the interest of the state.
2. A correlation of the processes by which the interest of the
state in the family as distinguished from its interest in the individ-
ual members of the family may receive adequate attention.
3. These processes for advancing the interest of the state in-
"" See generally, BEARD, RIsE OF AmEmuCAN Cmxvn7zAoN (1929) cc. I and Ii.
t6 ADAMS, PRov NCiAL SocIETY, 1690-1763 (1928) 278-279.
"17 1 VERNMER, op. cit. supra note 1, § 50.
m N. Y. Dom!. REL. LAw §§ 7, 25.
"1gWood v. Wood, 2 Paige 108, 111 (N. Y. 1830). See also supra note 22.
220 Beeby v. Beeby, 1 Hag. Ecc. 789 (1799).
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dude (a) an annulment proceeding conducted at the instance of the
state upon an interprofessional plane where the sole question is
whether the family which has started under a handicap can continue
to bear the burdens of public responsibility; (b,) a statute punish-
ing in the interest of the state those who tamper with marriage.
This statute would be called into operation after the enlarged annul-
ment process had functioned and upon the facts developed by that
process. A desirable feature of the statute would be wide discre-
tion in the court as to the action it may take in specific cases. The
right to impose a fine, imprisonment, probation, suspended sentence
should be given.
Conclusion
This article has set forth a problem and suggested a solution.
Three final questions deserve a word. The constitutionality of the
statute would seem to involve nothing more than arises in the case
of other crimes." If the effect of the combined annulment and
criminal proceeding is to give the court a very complete statement
of the facts of the case, such a movement would appear desirable
from every standpoint except that of the accused who has some-
thing he desires to conceal.
The social wisdom of the policy can be determined only by the
trial and error method. As this is the method employed with respect
to all the advances of civilization, it should excite neither surprise
nor fear. Safeguards are provided in the form of experts from the
various social sciences and the appellate court. There are mistakes
in the operation of every human institution. If they occur in the
administration of this process they are to be expected, but should not
cause alarm.
The question whether it is worth while to make the experiment
will be determined by the imagination and enthusiasm of the legal,
social and civic leaders in the respective communities. The greatest
argument in its favor is this: the present legal system provides a two-
dimensional plane in which to solve family problems. The proposal
"'1 Criminal statutes must conform with certain constitutional safeguards, such as
double jeopardy, ex post facto laws, trial by jury, accused's privilege of being con.
fronted by his accuser, habeas corpus, cruel and unusual punishments, self.incrimination,
etc. The draftsman of the proposed statute could easily provide for constitutional con.
formity.
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is to add a third, fourth and fifth dimension by the introduction of
the viewpoints of the various social sciences. The result should be
richer, more complete, true in each dimension.
John S. Bradiway
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